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Abstract:	 The	 professionalization	 and	 institutionalization	 of	 computing	 in	 Spain	 had	 a	 turning	
point	in	the	mid-1970s,	resulting	from	the	crisis	of	Franco’s	dictatorship	and	the	establishment	
of	a	constitutional	democracy	in	1976.	One	of	the	key	players	was	the	Association	of	Information	
Technology	Technicians	 (Asociación	de	Técnicos	de	 Informática,	ATI),	whose	activities	 included	
demands	 for	better	working	conditions	 in	 the	computing	 industry,	 the	promotion	of	academic	
programs	 in	 computer	 sciences	 and	 the	 lobbying	 for	 the	 regulation	 of	 computing	 to	 preserve	
privacy	 and	 personal	 freedom.	 In	 contrast	 with	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 where	 the	
Information	Technology	sector	grew	without	professionalization,	nor	unionism,	ATI's	claims	and	
commitments	were	coherent	with	wider	cultural,	economic	and	political	changes	in	the	country,	
and	were	inspired	by	the	climate	of	contemporary	left-wing	opposition	to	the	Francoist	regime	
in	Catalonia.	However,	once	democracy	was	established,	the	political	and	trade	union	activism	of	
the	Association	declined	to	almost	disappear.	
		
Introduction	
On	 October	 4th	 1967,	 31	 computing	 professionals	 meet	 at	 the	 headquarters	 of	 the	 French-
Spanish	 Association	 for	 Scientific	 and	 Technical	 Cooperation	 (Asociación	 Hispano-Francesa	 de	
Cooperación	 Técnica	 y	 Científica)	 in	 Barcelona1.	 Most	 of	 them	 were	 industrial	 engineers,	
members	of	the	National	Association	of	Industrial	Engineers	(Asociación	Nacional	de	Ingenieros	
Industriales,	ANII)2,	which	had	usually	made	postgraduate	studies	in	France3.	Earlier	in	the	year,	
they	had	set	up	informal	contacts	to	assess	the	state	of	computing	training	and	industry	in	Spain	
and	 discuss	 the	 establishment	 of	 formal	 structures	 for	 supporting	 professionalization,	 a	
challenging	 action	 under	 civic-rights	 limiting	 Franco’s	 dictatorship.	 Participants	 in	 the	meeting	
come	to	the	idea	of	creating	an	association	by	using	a	legal	loophole,	that	is,	by	establishing	a	so-
called	Technical	Commission	of	Computing	(Comisión	Técnica	de	Informática)	as	part	of	the	ANII.	
The	resulting	group	was	called	Association	of	Information	Technology	Technicians	(Asociación	de	
Técnicos	de	 Informática,	ATI),	 and	became	 the	 first	 Spanish	association	 representing	computer	
professionals.		
The	main	goals	of	the	ATI	were	expressed	in	a	chart,	which	stated	that	it	would	“facilitate	among	
partners	the	interchange	of	experiences	and	information	about	computing	techniques”,	“create	
working	 groups	 to	 perform	 work	 or	 research	 on	 these	 topics”,	 “perform	 demonstrations,	
seminars	and	conferences	on	 these	 topics,	 cooperate	with	others	organizers,	 and	publish	with	
and	 assist	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 results”,	 “promote	 dissemination	 in	 Spain	 of	 computing	
techniques”,	and	“make	contacts	with	national	and	international	associations	related	to	establish	
collaborations	within	these	topics”.	It	also	stressed	that	the	association	was	“committed	to	non-
profit	activities	and	independent	of	any	commercial	entity“.	In	a	market	dominated	by	IBM,	the	
foundational	members	of	the	ATI	wanted	to	build	an	abstract	knowledge	independent	from	any	
manufacturer.	 This	 choice	 was	 reflected	 in	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 new	 name	 for	 their	 discipline,	
choosing	 the	word	 informática	 instead	of	electronic	data	processing,	a	 term	closely	associated	
with	IBM.	They	also	added	“technicians”	in	their	name,	a	word	expressing	their	commitment	to	
the	 building	 of	 a	 specific	 knowledge	 and	 to	 professionalization4.	 All	 computing	 professionals	
were	 invited	 to	 join	 the	 association,	 being	no	mandatory	having	 a	University	 degree,	 but	 only	
two	years	of	experience	in	computing5.		
Six	years	 later,	by	the	end	of	1973,	the	ATI	counted	with	556	members	and	fulfilled	its	training	
support	dimension	by	organizing	about	 ten	courses	and	seminars	per	year.	 In	December	1974,	
under	the	determined	impulse	of	Julian	Marcelo-Cocho,	the	association	further	advanced	in	this	
goal	 by	 establishing	 its	 own	 publication,	 the	 journal	 Novática,	 which	 initially	 appeared	 as	 a	
supplement	of	Novatecnia,	the	journal	of	the	ANII.			
	
Figure	1.	Front	cover	of	the	first	issue	of	Novática.	The	title	of	the	journal	combines	the	name	of	
the	 ANII	 journal	 (NOVAtecnia)	 with	 the	 acronym	 of	 the	 new	 association	 (ATI)	 and	 the	 word	
“informATICA”.	 The	 cover	 reproduces	 the	 painting	 Las	 estructuras	 cambian,	 las	 esencias	
permanecen	 [“Structures	 change,	 essences	 remain”,	 1968],	 by	Manuel	 Valdés	&	 Rafael	 Solbes	
(Equipo	Crónica),	pioneers	of	Spanish	pop	Art.	
The	 expansion	 of	 ATI	 was	 simultaneous	 with	 a	 political	 transition	 in	 Spain	 from	 a	 military	
dictatorship	to	a	constitutional	democracy,	as	well	as	an	economic	one	resulting	from	the	impact	
of	1973	on	 the	Spanish	economy	and	a	cultural	and	social	one	 inspired	by	events	 in	European	
countries6.	 A	 climate	 of	 social	 unrest,	 political	 change	 and	 unleashed	 activism	 was	 a	 fertile	
ground	for	the	entanglement	of	professional	and	political	claims,	to	which	members	of	the	ATI	
were	not	 spared.	The	 strong	 links	between	Spanish	 leftist	movements	opposed	 to	 the	 regime,	
and	the	emergence	of	computing	as	a	profession	can	be	revealed	from	the	selection	of	topics	in	
Novática’s	 articles,	 covering	 the	 creation	 of	 trade	 unions,	 the	 improvement	 of	 salaries,	 equal	
rights	 for	 women	 and	 handicapped	 people	 or	 the	 respect	 of	 regional	 languages	 and	 medical	
coverage,	and	indeed	in	the	editorials,	which	called	for	the	defense	of	democracy	and	reflected	
upon	the	ethical	problems	of	electronic	data	processing.	
This	 interaction	 between	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 computing	 and	 political	 involvement	 bears	
similitude	–but	also	important	differences-	with	other	cases	analyzed	by	academic	historians.	For	
example,	Slava	Gerovitch	has	studied	the	 institutionalization	of	computing	 in	 the	Soviet	Union,	
showing	that	soviet	cybernetics	become	part	of	a	social	movement	for	radical	reform	in	science	
and	society,	criticized	under	Stalin	as	a	weapon	of	 imperialist	 ideology	and	rehabilitated	under	
Khrushchev	 to	 be	 hailed	 as	 a	 "science	 in	 the	 service	 of	 communism".	 For	 Gerovitch,	 these	
changes	reveal	the	changing	power	relations	within	the	scientific	community	and	in	the	political	
role	of	scientists	and	engineers	in	Soviet	society7.	In	the	United	States,	Paul	Edwards	has	shown	
how	 computing	 enabled	 the	 formation	 and	 pursuit	 of	 Cold	 War	 politics,	 and	 how	 computer	
metaphors	 shaped	 American	 intellectual	 life8.	 Also	 regarding	 the	 American	 case,	 Fred	 Turner	
history	 of	 the	Whole	 Earth	 Catalog	 has	 shown	 how	 the	 counterculture	movement	 of	 the	 late	
1960s	and	early	1970s	accompanied	the	transformation	of	the	image	of	computing	from	a	Cold	
war	product	to	a	guarantee	of	 individualism	and	democracy9.	Finally,	Eden	Medina	has	studied	
the	importance	of	Cybersyn,	a	project	lead	by	the	British	cyberneticist	Stafford	Beer	for	Salvador	
Allende,	 democratic	 president	 of	 Chile	 from	1970	until	 the	 coup	d’état	 of	 1973.	 Cybersyn	 aim	
was	to	help	to	implement	the	transition	of	Chile's	economy	from	capitalism	to	socialism,	and	was	
instrumental	to	avoid	the	collapse	of	economy	during	a	truck	divers	strike	in	197210.		
Our	case	study	provides	an	opportunity	to	connect	some	of	the	themes	evoked	in	this	literature	
with	 classical	 approaches	 about	 the	 process	 of	 professionalization	 taken	 from	 the	 history	 and	
sociology	 of	 professions.	 A	 good	 departure	 point	 can	 be	 Abbott’s	 “ecological”	 view,	 which	
explains	the	emergence	of	a	profession	from	processes	of	differentiation	within	occupations,	its	
configuration	by	means	of	struggle	at	different	levels	(the	workplace,	culture,	public	opinion,	and	
legal	and	administrative	rules),	and	its	consolidation	through	conflict	between	different	technical	
communities	mediated	 by	 jurisdictional	 claims11.	 Inspired	 by	 this	 view,	Nathan	 Ensmerger	 has	
studied	the	“failed”	professionalization	of	computing	in	the	1960s,	a	period	characterized	by	the	
unsuccessful	 efforts	 by	 computer	 programmers	 to	 achieve	 “control	 over	 entry	 into	 the	
profession,	and	the	adoption	of	a	shared	body	of	abstract	occupational	knowledge”12.	However,	
they	 also	 resisted	 the	 desire	 of	 corporate	 managers	 to	 transform	 them	 in	 a	 standardized,	
tractable	 workforce.	 According	 to	 Ensmerger,	 the	 resulting,	 undefined	 situation	 of	 computer	
programmers	arising	from	this	conflict	leads	to	characterize	them	as	technicians,	which	Stephen	
Barley	 define	 as	 a	 category	 constituted	 by	 white-collar	 workers	 with	 scientific	 or	 engineering	
training,	but	that	also	value	craft	knowledge.	These	workers	play	an	important	role	as	mediators	
between	 the	 technological	 and	 social	 architectures	 of	 the	 organizations,	 conducting	
sophisticated	scientific	and	mathematical	analyses,	and	are	granted	quite	a	 lot	of	autonomy	by	
their	employers13.	
IT	 workers	 in	 Spain	 encountered	 similar	 problems,	 but	 in	 this	 case	 the	 move	 to	
professionalization	encouraged	by	the	government	policy	was	perceived	as	a	way	to	disempower	
and	control	computing	workforce,	and	therefore	ATI	developed	a	strong	opposition	via	ANSAPI	
and	Novática14.	 In	this	case,	the	adoption	of	the	name	“technician”	to	describe	their	work	was	
instrumental	 in	 their	 fight	against	corporations	and	the	State,	by	helping	them	to	keep	away	a	
“professionalization”	that,	from	their	point	of	view,	meant	control	and	division	of	the	computing	
labor	force15.	Here,	the	main	difference	with	the	American	case	studied	by	Ensmerger	is	the	key	
role	of	 the	State	 in	the	definition	of	professions,	and	the	 instability	of	 the	political	background	
due	to	the	end	of	the	dictatorship	and	the	transition	to	democratic	regime.	As	we	will	see,	the	
political	involvement	of	the	leaders	of	the	IT	community	was	strong	in	Spain	during	the	transition	
to	 democracy,	 but	 restrained	 to	 local	 settings	 and	 short	 time	 spans.	 Once	 democracy	 was	
established,	we	found	ATI	members	as	university	lecturers	or	well	positioned	professionals	in	the	
IT	industry,	but	none	of	them	as	politicians.	After	being	very	prominent	for	some	time,	political	
discourses	 eventually	 faded	 and	 leave	 place	 to	 standard	 discipline-building	 activities,	 mostly	
focused	on	university	institutionalization	and	professional	lobbying.	
In	order	to	show	this	gradual	transition,	we	focus	on	the	first	years	of	ATI16,	which	we	have	just	
described	 as	 the	main	 professional	 association	 of	 computer	 professionals	 in	 Spain.	 By	 closely	
following	the	activities	and	debates	in	which	this	association	was	involved,	we	aim	to	reveal	the	
ties	 between	 the	 political	 context	 and	 the	 process	 of	 professionalization	 of	 computing	 in	 late	
Francoism.	The	argument	unfolds	in	three	parts:	first,	we	describe	the	Spanish	political	context	in	
late	1970s	and	try	to	understand	ATI’s	activities	supporting	computer	professionals’	rights;	then,	
we	focus	on	the	involvement	of	ATI	in	the	creation	of	the	first	university	studies	in	computing	in	
Barcelona;	 finally,	 we	 study	 ATI’s	 lobbying	 activities	 with	 political	 parties	 and	 its	 influence	 in	
legislation,	 and	 especially	 in	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 reference	 to	 computing	 in	 the	 Spanish	
constitution.	
Politics,	labor	and	computing	in	Franco’s	Spain		
The	creation	of	the	ATI	and	 its	early	activities	can	be	better	understood	by	taking	 into	account	
the	context	of	 labor	regulations	and	the	expansion	of	computing	 in	Spain	by	the	mid-1970s.	 In	
the	 early	 1970s,	 the	 country	 was	 a	 political	 anomaly	 in	 Western	 Europe.	 A	 fascist	 military	
dictatorship,	 led	by	General	Franco	since	1939	after	a	Civil	War	provoked	by	a	right-wing	coup	
d’état	 in	 1936,	 had	 survived	 the	 defeat	 of	 their	 supporting	 Axis	 powers	 in	 World	 War	 2	 by	
realigning	 itself	as	a	close	ally	of	 the	United	States	during	the	Cold	War.	Despite	maintaining	a	
totalitarian	attitude	regarding	social	mores,	religion	and	political	rights,	its	economy	had	evolved	
from	 autarky	 to	 a	 relative	 openness	 to	 foreign	 commerce	 following	 the	 1953	 USA-Spain	
agreements.	From	1959,	a	new	customs	tariffs	policy	and	an	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)-
inspired	 stabilization	 plan	 implemented	 a	 new	 economic	 policy	 that	 –on	 the	 basis	 of	 cheap	
salaries,	 low	 taxes,	 foreign	 investment	 and	 the	 development	 of	 tourism	 –led	 to	 the	 so-called	
“Spanish	economic	miracle”17.	
Since	 the	 establishment	 of	 General	 Franco’s	 rule,	 labor	 relationships	were	 initially	molded	 on	
fascist	 and	 Nazi	 models,	 which	 banned	 free	 trade	 unions	 and	 established	 a	 state-controlled	
organization.	The	Spanish	Union	Organization	(Organización	Sindical	Española,	OSE,	also	known	
as	Sindicato	Vertical)	regulated	the	relations	between	workers	and	their	employers	by	controlling	
and	monitoring	workers,	served	the	state’s	surveillance	goals	by	informing	the	government	when	
a	 problem	 occurred	 in	 production,	 and	 performed	 bureaucratic	 tasks	 on	 labor	 administration	
such	 as	 collecting	 economic	 statistics18.	 The	 OSE,	 interestingly,	 was	 a	 key	 target	 of	 the	
underground	Spanish	Communist	Party	and	its	associated	trade	union	Comisiones	Obreras,	CCOO	
(Workers’	Commissions),	which	abandoned	armed	resistance	since	the	early	1950s	and	tried	to	
undermine	 the	 regime	 from	 inside,	 by	 infiltrating	 its	 members	 as	 representatives	 in	 the	
organization19.	
The	role	of	OSE	in	structuring	labor	relationships,	which	was	tightly	enforced	during	the	autarkic	
period,	began	to	deteriorate	when	the	regime’s	economic	policies	evolved	in	the	late	1950s,	 in	
particular	with	 the	establishment	 in	1958	of	a	new	 law	allowing	collective	agreements	 (Ley	de	
Convenios	Colectivos)20,	which	allowed	for	the	existence	of	negotiation	inside	companies.	Indeed,	
the	Civil	Code	was	reformed	in	1965	following	an	important	wave	of	miners’	strikes	in	1962	and	
international	 pressure.	 Strikes,	 which	 were	 strictly	 forbidden	 in	 early	 Francoism	 –they	 were	
assimilated	 to	 the	 crime	 of	 sedition–	 were	 decriminalized	 if	 they	 were	 strictly	 related	 with	
workers’	economic	demands21.		
In	 relation	 to	 computing,	 the	 Spanish	 market	 was	 dominated	 by	 machines	 produced	 in	 the	
United	 States.	 In	 the	 autarky	 period	 (1939-1953),	 IBM	 (and	 before	 although	not	 yet	with	 that	
name)	almost	monopolized	the	Spanish	market.	IBM	stated	its	supremacy	in	the	Spanish	market	
in	three	legs	that	complemented	each	other	perfectly;	the	quality	and	comprehensiveness	of	its	
systems,	 which	 took	 into	 account	 the	 whole	 life	 product,	 from	 pre-sales	 services	 to	 the	
installation	and	start-up22;	the	aggressiveness	of	 its	marketing	campaigns,	which	had	important	
echo	 in	 Spanish	 newspapers23;	 and	 its	multinational	 policy,	 that	 officially	 rejected	 bribery	 and	
compromise	with	authoritarian	regimes,	but	also	knew	how	to	please	the	governments	installing	
new	 factories	 or	 sale	 offices24.	 Most	 companies	 gradually	 replaced	 their	 electromechanical	
tabulating	 machines	 by	 electronic	 models	 such	 as	 the	 IBM	 609	 (continuation	 from	 604,	 but	
transistorized)	and	Bull	300.	By	1952,	Guillermo	Turinger's	Company	began	to	sell	Bull	machines,	
the	 two	 first	 being	 acquired	 by	 the	 government	 administration	 in	 1953.	 Bull	Gamma	3	 fought	
against	 the	 IBM	604	and	 the	 IBM's	market	share	 fell	 to	70-80%	by	 the	end	of	 the	decade,	 still	
with	tabulating	machines.	
In	 1959,	 the	 Spanish	 government	presented	 a	 stabilization	plan	 to	 the	 International	Monetary	
Fund,	 which	 abandoned	 hopes	 of	 autarkic	 development	 and	 eased	 the	 import	 of	 foreign	
technology25.	 As	 a	 result,	 Spanish	 companies	 had	 access	 to	 foreign	 goods	 at	 prices	 that,	 on	
average,	were	halved26.	Economic	stabilization	boosted	Spanish	 industrialization	 in	general	and	
computerization	 in	 particular.	 Between	 1959	 and	 1961,	 the	 number	 of	 tabulating	 machines	
increased	 by	 50%27.	 The	 first	 computers	 were	 imported	 in	 late	 1950s	 to	 be	 implemented	 in	
Spanish	 public	 corporations,	 such	 as	 the	 National	 Railway	 Company	 (Red	 Nacional	 de	
Ferrocarriles	Españoles,	RENFE),	which	acquired	an	 IBM	650	 in	1958,	and	 the	National	Nuclear	
Research	 Institution	 (Junta	 de	 Energía	Nuclear,	 JEN),	which	 acquired	 an	UNIVAC	UCT	 in	 1959.	
However,	 these	 big	 computers	 were	 not	 representative	 of	 the	 business	 model	 followed	 by	
Spanish	 companies	 in	 the	 process	 of	mechanization	 (a	word	 commonly	 used	 before	 the	 IBM-
inspired	expression	“electronic	data	processing”	spread),	as	it	was	focused	on	gradually	replacing	
accounting	machines	by	electronic	versions,	and	expand	the	market	to	new	kinds	of	users.		
An	example	of	 this	strategy	was	 IBM	1401,	which	was	presented	at	 the	Barcelona	trade	fair	 in	
1961,	and	its	subsequent	competitor,	the	Bull	Gamma	1028.	By	mid-1960s,	IBM	had	recovered	its	
dominant	 position,	 achieving	 a	 maximum	 share	 of	 90%	 of	 the	 market.	 In	 the	 1970s,	 the	
emergence	 of	 new	 competitors	 (NCR,	 Siemens),	 the	 highest	 penetration	 of	 old	 (Univac,	
Honeywell-Bull),	and	especially	the	change	in	purchasing	policies	of	banks,	the	state	and	public	
companies	reduced	this	quota.	Still,	IBM	was	by	large	the	first	in	the	ranking,	both	in	revenues	as	
in	 number	 of	 installed	 machines,	 followed	 by	 Univac	 (in	 revenues)	 or	 by	 Honeywell-Bull	 (in	
equipment).	As	figure	3	shows,	the	rest	of	manufacturers	represented	a	few	piece	of	the	market.		
Computers	 also	 spread	 in	 sectors	 of	 Spanish	 industry	 such	 as	 banking	 or	 telecommunications,	
leading	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 community	 of	 workers	 involved	 in	 computing	 tasks	 that,	 by	
1971,	attained	11,551	people29.	As	shown	in	figure	4,	most	of	them	were	assistants	and	manual	
operators,	including	an	important	–and	much	feminized-	workforce	of	keypunchers.		
	
	
Figure	2.	Investments	in	computing	by	activity	sector,	1972.	Source:	Presidencia	del	Gobierno,	La	
Informática	en	España,	Servicio	Central	de	Informática,	1973.	
	
Figure	3.	Ranking	of	manufacturers	by	 revenues	 in	1975.	 Source:	 Presidencia	del	Gobierno,	La	
Informática	en	España	1976,	Servicio	Central	de	Informática,	1977.	
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	Figure	4.	Workers	related	to	computing	 in	Spain	by	1971.	Source:	Presidencia	del	Gobierno,	La	
informática	en	España,	Servicio	Central	de	Informática,	1973.	
	
The	 Americanization	 of	 the	 computer	 market	 in	 Spain	 led	 to	 training	 structures	 for	 new	
professionals	 in	computing	very	 similar	 than	 those	developed	 in	 the	United	States	one	decade	
before30.	 In	 Spain,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 USA,	 computer	manufacturers	 established	 and	 controlled	
training	 practices,	 making	 entry	 tests	 for	 potential	 recruits,	 running	 training	 courses	 and	
designing	 the	 syllabi.	 Indeed,	 as	 in	 the	United	 States,	manufacturers	 alone	 could	 not	 produce	
enough	 trained	programmers	 to	 keep	with	 industry’s	 needs,	 leading	 to	 increasing	 salaries	 and	
programmers’	claims	for	professional	recognition.	Fast	computerization	put	workers	of	Spanish	
data	 centers	 in	good	bargaining	position,	and	consequently	 they	enjoyed	a	 situation	 similar	 to	
their	 American	 counterparts	 ten	 years	 earlier:	 decent	 salaries,	 relative	 autonomy	 and	 easy	
mobility	in	a	context	in	which	headhunting	was	quite	common.	Situated	in	an	independent	space	
between	blue	and	white	 collar	workers,	 they	mastered	an	art	–programming-	 that	 few	people	
could	 understand	 inside	 the	 company.	 From	 the	 companies’	 point	 of	 view,	 electronic	 data	
processing	was	considered	as	a	tool	critical	for	the	modernization,	automation	and	reduction	of	
costs,	 and	 they	 did	 not	 promote	 any	 division	 of	 labor	 or	 professionalization	 among	 computer	
workers	 at	 least	until	 the	early	1970s,	when	 the	 first	 collective	agreements	 listed	were	 signed	
and	established	different	computer	categories31.		
In	this	context,	founding	members	of	the	ATI	shared	a	concern	for	legitimizing	their	profession,	
and	 to	 get	 some	 autonomy	 from	 hardware	 manufacturers.	 This	 desire	 of	 independence	 was	
expressed	 in	the	two	main	points	of	the	chart	of	the:	 improved	training,	which	meant	 learning	
programming	 techniques	 independently	 from	 any	 manufacturer,	 and	 defense	 of	 better	 labor	
conditions.	In	this	respect,	it	is	important	to	remember	that	the	ATI	was	born	in	Barcelona,	which	
was	 not	 only	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 industrial	 centers	 of	 Spain,	 counting	 a	 thriving	
community	of	computer	technicians	(see	figure	6),	but	also	a	highly	mobilized	society	in	terms	of	
activism	and	opposition	to	the	dictatorship32.																																																			
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Figure	5.	 Industrial	 centers	 in	Spain	by	1974.	Courtesy	of	 the	University	of	Texas	 Libraries,	 the	
University	of	Texas,	Austin.	
	
	
	
Figure	6.	Computer	workers	by	 region	 in	1973	and	1975.	 Source:	Presidencia	del	Gobierno,	La	
informática	 en	 España,	 Servicio	 Central	 de	 Informática,	 1973;	 Presidencia	 del	 Gobierno,	 La	
informática	en	España	1976,	Servicio	central	de	informática,	1977.	
Many	of	ATI’s	members	were	active	in	the	defense	of	computing	workers’	rights	during	the	late	
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Francoism.	 In	 the	 late	 1960s,	 some	of	 them	 infiltrated	 the	OSE	 through	 its	 “diverse	 activities”	
branch.	 In	 December	 1969,	 the	 regime	 counteracted	 this	 move	 by	 creating	 the	 National	
Autonomous	 Union	 Association	 of	 Informatics	 Professionals	 (Asociación	 Nacional	 Sindical	
Autónoma	 de	 Profesionales	 de	 la	 Informática,	 ANSAPI),	 a	 union	 that	 had	 its	 headquarters	 in	
Madrid	and	was	closely	controlled	by	the	regime:	the	members	of	its	board	were	designed	by	the	
president	 of	 the	 diverse	 activities	 branch,	 Juan	 García-Carrés33.	 However,	 in	 April	 1972	 the	
members	of	ATI	who	had	started	union	activities	were	recognized	as	the	board	of	the	delegation	
of	ANSAPI	in	Barcelona,	which	could	be	elected	democratically34.	This	position	allowed	them	to	
establish	 direct	 communication	 with	 the	 government	 and	 get	 information	 about	 ongoing	
regulating	plans.	On	the	other	hand,	it	avoided	tensions	inside	the	ATI,	shifting	an	important	part	
of	the	political	fight	to	the	ANSAPI.		
ANSAPI	Barcelona	early	efforts	were	oriented	against	the	Spanish	government	plans’	to	create	an	
official	 professional	 guild	 (colegio	 profesional)	 of	 computer	 technicians,	 such	 as	 in	 other	
engineering	 professions,	 in	 which	 an	 official	 association	 membership	 was	 mandatory	 for	 all	
professionals	and	all	members	had	to	have	a	university	diploma35.	The	reasons	of	this	opposition	
can	be	found	in	article	published	in	Novática,	which	in	1975	included	the	translation	of	an	article	
by	Philip	Kraft	that	described	professional	guilds	as	examples	of	a	strategy	to	divide	works,	and	
as	a	danger	to	worker’s	collective	action36.	This	same	argument	was	also	expressed	 in	a	report	
evaluating	the	pros	and	cons	of	this	new	institution	that	concluded	that	it	was	created	“to	divide,	
to	 control	 and	 to	 frame”	 computer	 professionals,	 and	 that	 strict	 membership	 requirements	
would	introduce	class	distinctions	among	computer	people37.		
Legitimizing	computer	workers:	ATI’s	opposition	to	the	Instituto	de	Informática	
The	 second	 activity	 in	which	 ATI	 and	 ANSAPI	 invested	most	 efforts	 was	 the	 resistance	 to	 the	
Spanish	government	plans	to	regulate	the	training	of	computer	professionals,	which	population	
was	 estimated	 around	 45,000	 people	 and	 that	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 decade	 could	 double	 this	
number38.	In	order	to	regulate	this	envisaged	growth,	the	Spanish	government	aimed	to	make	of	
computing	one	of	the	main	lines	of	its	fourth	“development	plan”39.	This	kind	of	instrument	for	
macroeconomic	planning	had	been	conceived	and	 implemented	 in	 the	mid-1960	by	mimicking	
the	French	“plans	de	modernization”	created	just	after	the	Second	World	War,	and	were	justified	
by	 the	regime’s	new	economic	experts	as	a	middle	way	between	 individual	 initiative	and	state	
planning.	 By	 the	 early	 1970s,	 two	 development	 plans	 had	 been	 implemented	 in	 Spain	
(respectively	for	the	periods	1964-67	and	1968-71)	and	a	third	one	(for	the	period	1971-75)	was	
on	the	run40.	The	last	years	of	the	regime	coincided	with	discussions	related	to	the	fourth	plan,	
for	the	period	1976-1979,	which	had	to	focus	to	some	extent	on	the	development	of	computing.	
In	order	to	 implement	the	plan,	a	committee	on	computing	was	established	by	the	ministry	of	
planning	and	development	(Ministerio	de	Planificación	y	Desarrollo),	counting	with	64	members	
divided	in	12	subgroups41.	The	composition	of	these	committees	provides	an	interesting	picture	
of	 the	 leaders	and	 structure	of	 the	computing	community	and	 the	 selection	bias	 related	 to	 its	
proximity	to	the	regime.	For	example,	89	%	of	members	of	these	committees	lived	in	Madrid	and	
the	 rest	 of	 them	 in	 Barcelona	 (including	 the	 president	 of	 ATI).	 Almost	 all	 participants	 from	
Madrid	 worked	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 (army,	 government,	 university	 and	 public	 companies).	 In	
contrast,	 all	 of	 members	 of	 Barcelona	 worked	 in	 private	 companies	 (two	 computer	
manufacturers,	 one	 from	 banking,	 one	 automobile	 manufacturer	 and	 one	 from	 a	 software	
company)42.	
As	resulting	of	these	discussions,	one	institution,	the	Madrid’s	Instituto	de	Informática,	emerged	
as	a	potentially	important	instrument	to	put	the	new	computing	profession	under	state	control.	
Established	 by	 decree	 in	 196943,	 the	 institute	 had	 officially	 the	 objective	 of	 coping	 with	 the	
“constant	 increment	 of	 electronic	 computers	 installed	 in	 the	 country”44.	 Independent	 of	
universities,	 its	 courses	 on	 computing	 followed	 the	 example	 of	 the	 British	 Computer	 Society	
professional	 grades,	 established	 in	 196845,	 and	merely	 provided	 validation	 and	 certification	 of	
the	grades	acquired	by	professionals.	In	1971,	its	curriculum	was	structured	in	5	years,	allowing	
for	 different	 grades:	 application	 programmer,	 system	 programmer,	 application	 analyst,	 and	
system	analyst	and	system	technician,	the	five	categories	prevailing	at	IBM	at	the	time46.		
The	 creation	 of	 the	 Instituto	 de	 Informática	 triggered	 a	 debate	 on	 the	 need	 of	 legitimating	
computer	 work	 as	 a	 profession.	 The	 institute’s	 curriculum	 could	 have	 been	 a	 step	 towards	
professionalization,	but	the	method	established	to	regulate	the	access	to	the	different	categories	
in	the	computing	profession	had	no	consensus	inside	the	profession:	professionals	felt	they	had	
been	excluded	and	that,	instead	of	fulfilling	their	aspirations,	it	hindered	them.	In	fact,	it	can	be	
argued	that	this	climate	of	opposition	was	instrumental	for	the	creation	of	the	Catalan	branch	of	
ANSAPI:	 in	 summer	1971	 the	ATI	had	addressed	an	article	 to	all	 computer	professionals	about	
the	 government	 plans	 to	 make	 the	 Instituto	 de	 Informática	 a	 key	 element	 in	 professional	
training.	This	document,	signed	by	Albert	Coromines47,	was	followed	in	autumn	1971	by	a	letter	
of	complaint	to	the	Minister	of	Education,	announcing	the	activation	of	ANSAPI	Barcelona,	which	
had	its	foundational	assembly	in	Barcelona	in	April	1972.	The	proceedings	of	this	meeting	show	
that	 the	 first	 decision	 to	 be	 implemented	 was	 to	 take	 legal	 actions	 against	 the	 Instituto	 de	
Informática,	by	arguing	that	85%	of	computer	people	would	be	out	of	the	profession	according	
to	 the	 criteria	 of	 the	 institute48.	 The	 second	 one,	 in	 the	 same	 spirit,	 was	 to	 get	 collective	
agreements	with	 companies	 to	 introduce	 computer	 labor	 categories	without	 reference	 to	 the	
degrees	implemented	by	the	Instituto	de	Informática.		
A	second	front	 in	ATI’s	 fight	against	the	 institute	was	to	offer	alternative	training	courses	to	 IT	
technicians.	Organized	by	 the	 so-called	 “ATI’s	 technical	 sections”,	 they	 consisted	 seminars	and	
conferences	 in	 the	 classrooms	of	 the	Engineering	School	of	Barcelona	about	 computer	 related	
topics	 –which	 sometimes	 lead	 to	 publications-	 and	 structured	 courses,	 not	 only	 oriented	 to	
commercial	 programming	 (which	 had	 more	 audience)49	 but	 also	 to	 programming	 theory50.	
Although	the	number	of	activities	was	not	stable	year	after	year51,	 lecturers	were	often	of	high	
profile,	 including	 foreign	 computer	 specialists.	 In	 fact,	most	 of	 the	 seminaries	 dealt	 with	 very	
innovative	programming	techniques	at	the	time,	explaining	the	state	of	the	art	and	sometimes	
confronting	 different	methodology	 schools.	 For	 instance,	 the	 ATI	 organized	 in	 1974	 a	 seminar	
entitled	“Practical	Applications	of	the	Structured	Programming”,	in	which	Manuel	Costa,	Eugenio	
Romero	and	Miquel	Barceló	spoke	about	improved	programming	technology	operations,	as	well	
as	 Bertini	 and	 Warnier	 methods.	 Those	 activities	 also	 helped	 to	 build	 a	 shared	 vision	 of	
computing	 programming	 among	 the	 associates,	 which	 included	 a	 heterogeneous	 population,	
giving	them	not	only	the	rudiments	of	specific	manufacturers’	products,	but	also	knowledge	of	
advanced	 programming	 techniques	 and	 a	 vision	 about	 the	 emerging	 discipline	 of	 computer	
science.		
	
	
Figure	7.	Seminaries	held	at	the	ATI	in	1971.	Source:	ATI	archives,	
http://www.ati.es/IMG/pdf/Asamblea_ATI_1972.pdf	(retrieved	11	February	2015).	
	
A	committed	and	expanding	community:	the	growth	of	ATI,	Novática	and	political	controversy	
Opposition	to	the	regime’s	plans	regarding	the	profession	and	the	climate	of	social	unrest	in	late	
Franco’s	dictatorship	contributed	to	the	expansion	of	the	ATI	and	to	its	engagement	with	current	
political	controversies.	For	example,	in	October	1st	1975,	while	Franco	was	dying,	far-right	politic	
forces	organized	a	violent	street	protest	 in	Madrid	to	support	the	dictator.	That	same	evening,	
six	prominent	members	of	the	ATI	decided	to	accelerate	the	creation	of	a	delegation	in	Madrid	
the	 day	 after52.	 50	 people,	 recruited	 by	 the	 president	 of	 ATI,	 Ramon	 Puigjaner	 and	 ATI’s	
Secretary,	Xavier	Berenguer,	who	had	moved	from	Barcelona,	attended	the	first	session.	At	the	
same	meeting,	an	Interim	Board	was	created53,	and	seven	tentative	rules	were	drafted,	including	
one	affirming	ATI’s	independence	of	“any	commercial	entity"54.		
In	 the	 following	 years,	 the	 ATI	 opened	 new	 locations	 and	 the	 number	 of	 its	 members	 grew	
dramatically.	By	the	beginning	of	1977,	a	delegate	group	of	ATI	was	created	in	Valencia	with	20	
initial	members.	This	same	year,	 the	ATI’s	membership	had	risen	to	898	members	 in	Catalonia	
(which	was	still	the	association’s	center	of	gravity),	251	in	Madrid	and	69	in	the	rest	of	Spain55.	It	
included	very	different	technical	profiles,	from	manufacturers,	to	computer	users,	consultants	or	
public	servants.	According	to	early	ATI’s	coordinator	Julian	Marcelo-Cocho,	they	were	attracted	
by	 the	 aforementioned	 tensions	 about	 workers’	 representation,	 professional	 legitimacy	 and	
training56.		
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Figure	 8.	 Evolution	 of	 the	 ATI’s	 membership	 between	 December	 1968	 and	 December	 1977.	
Source:	Proceedings	of	ATI’s	meetings,	ATI	archives	and	Ramon	Puigjaner	personal	archives.	
	
The	 activities	 of	 the	 ATI	 cannot	 be	 only	 understood	 as	 arising	 of	 a	 desire	 of	 professional	
legitimization,	 but	 they	were	 framed	by	 the	 turbulent	 political	 context	 of	 Spain’s	 transition	 to	
democracy	and	in	a	particular	vision	of	computing.	Many	of	the	proposals	concerning	computer	
technicians’	professional	role	were	informed	by	an	egalitarian	ideology	and	the	guidelines	traced	
by	 communist	 trade-union	 CCOO.	 For	 example,	 the	 ATI	 refused	 that	 computer	 workers	 were	
segregated	 professionally	 by	 companies	 or	 governments	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 workers,	 and	
defended	 collective	 negotiation	 between	 workers	 and	 company.	 In	 fact,	 there	 was	 a	 close	
articulation	 between	 ANSAPI	 and	 the	 CCOO:	 the	 ANSAPI	 coordinated	 the	 branches	Oficinas	 y	
despachos	 (software	 companies)	 and	 CCOO	 the	 Metal	 branch	 (hardware	 companies),	 its	
members	being	successfully	elected	in	the	last	trade	unions	elections	under	the	Francoist	regime.	
With	the	new	democratic	regime,	ANSAPI	disappeared	and	its	members	could	move	to	the	new	
legalized	trade	unions.	
Another	evidence	of	the	determined	political	agenda	of	the	board	of	the	ATI,	well	aligned	with	
the	 strategies	 and	 values	 of	 left-wing	 forces	 in	 the	 late	 Francoism,	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	 the	
papers	published	in	Novática,	the	association	journal	established	in	late	1974.	The	main	goal	of	
this	 publication	 was	 to	 act	 as	 a	 channel	 of	 expression	 of	 the	 association,	 and	 the	 themes	
addressed	there	were	coherent	with	to	the	objectives	of	ATI’s	foundational	regulations.	Novática	
not	only	it	had	a	section	about	computer	science	subjects,	usually	monographs,	but	also	regular	
sections	about	social,	technical	and	news	issues.	In	these	sections	the	tight	relationship	between	
ATI	 and	 ANSAPI	 Barcelona	was	 also	 reflected	 in	 a	 regular	 section	 called	 “Workplace”	 (Mundo	
Laboral),	which	acted	as	ANSAPI	newsletter	since	1974.	In	this	section,	ANSAPI	Barcelona	tried	to	
keep	 Spanish	 computer	 people	 aware	 of	 the	 profession	 problems	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 and	
informed	them	about	any	negotiation	between	companies	and	their	Electronic	Data	Processing	
departments,	new	collective	agreements,	trade	union	elections	or	strikes.	We	find	in	the	journal,	
for	 example,	 some	 critiques	 to	 create	 specific	 union	 for	 computer	 workers,	 and	 the	
recommendation	that	computer	workers	integrate	the	company’s	trade	union	to	negotiate	as	a	
block	with	all	other	workers.	At	the	same	time,	Novática’s	collaborators	read	American	computer	
magazines	and	appropriated	their	concerns57.		
Labor	 activities	 were	 not	 the	 only	 politically	 charged	 subjects	 addressed	 by	Novática,	 whose	
articles	alternated	between	utopian	and	dystopian	 images	of	 computing,	either	warning	about	
the	threats	of	computing	or	expressing	hopes	in	a	future	where	computer	will	be	able	to	improve	
and	 dignify	 human	 work	 and	 the	 human	 society	 in	 general.	 For	 example,	 the	 success	 of	
microcomputers	over	mainframes	was	considered	positively,	as	it	would	imply	less	centralization	
and	 control	 that,	 under	 capitalism,	will	 drive	 society	 towards	 an	Orwellian	dystopia58.	 Political	
events	such	as	the	Chilean	use	of	computer	for	repression	in	1975,	which	was	closely	followed	by	
Novática59,	 or	 the	 reference	 to	 French	 intellectuals	 such	 as	 Benjamin	 Coriat60,	 reinforced	
dystopian	views,	but	in	general	these	images	were	generally	more	optimistic	than	contemporary	
critics	of	computing.		
At	a	more	 local	 level,	Novática	was	a	 forum	for	at	 least	three	main	controversies	 involving	the	
position	of	the	ATI	regarding	regional	languages	(and	more	specifically	Catalan),	its	relations	with	
the	 communist	 party	 and	 its	 position	 regarding	 data	 privacy.	 The	 first	 controversy,	 on	 August	
1976,	involved	the	reaction	to	the	publication	in	the	French	journal	Paris-Match	of	an	interview	
with	the	Spanish	Prime	Minister	and	former	member	of	Franco’s	government,	Adolfo	Suarez,	in	
which	 he	 dismissed	 the	 possibility	 of	 using	 of	 Catalan	 language	 in	 Catalan	 schools61.	 At	 best,	
Suarez’s	declaration	was	a	proof	of	ignorance	from	someone	who	had	never	been	to	Catalonia;	
at	worst,	 it	was	an	exercise	of	 cynicism	because	 the	Francoist	 regime	had	 tried,	 from	the	very	
beginning	of	the	dictatorship,	to	restrict	the	use	of	Iberian	languages	other	than	Castilian62.		
This	 interview	was	 reproduced,	 in	Spanish,	by	 the	 right-wing	newspaper	ABC	 a	 few	days	 later.	
Almost	immediately,	several	reactions	took	place.	Newspapers	like	La	Vanguardia,	in	Barcelona,	
received	complaint	letters	and	many	professional	organizations	(the	Catalan	Society	of	Chemical	
and	Physics	 Science	 and	Mathematics	 and	 the	professional	 association	of	 Industrial	 Engineers,	
among	 others)	 expressed	 their	 disagreement63.	 Members	 of	 the	 ATI	 also	 participated	 in	 the	
controversy	with	the	publication	of	an	article	in	Novática	that	argued	for	equal	opportunities	for	
Catalan,	Basque	or	Galician	as	 for	Castilian64.	 In	 reaction	 to	 this	article,	 the	Madrid	publication	
Informática	criticized	the	implication	of	the	ATI	in	the	controversy,	considering	that	it	played	the	
role	of	a	political	party	rather	than	of	a	professional	association65.	The	journal	asked	rhetorically	
if	 ATI	 members	 were	 aware	 of	 their	 political	 membership	 and	 whether	 the	 ATI’s	 rulers	 were	
elected	according	professional	or	political	criteria,	and	finally	argued	that	speaking	Catalan	would	
decrease	professional	expectations	of	computer	professionals.	
ATI’s	 reply	was	published	 in	 a	Novática’s	monographic	 on	 IT	 policy,	 in	 the	 section	 called	 “real	
time”,	usually	written	by	Xavier	Berenguer,	which	dealt	with	“computing	and	society”	issues.	The	
author	 remarked	 that	 other	 professional	 and	 scientific	 institutions	 had	 criticized	 Suarez’s	
opinions,	 and	 they	 had	not	 been	 accused	of	 intromission	on	politics,	 that	 it	was	 Informatica’s	
blame	 to	not	be	 able	 to	distinguish	 the	difference	of	 a	professional	 association	and	a	political	
party	was,	and	that	the	ATI	was	a	democratic	 institution,	which	democratically	chose	 its	board	
every	two	years66.	
In	 this	 same	 year,	 Novática	 included	 indeed	 an	 editorial	 refusing	 the	 perceived	 left-wing	
ideological	 bias	 of	 the	 magazine.	 The	 ATI	 claimed	 for	 the	 unity	 of	 all	 the	 different	 computer	
people	organizations	was	necessary	 to	deal	with	 its	 collective	problems:	 training,	 validation	of	
degrees	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 representation	 and	 not	 to	 translate	 the	 political	 fight	 methods	 to	
professional	organizations67.	On	the	other	side,	there	is	evidence	that	the	association	could	not	
isolate	itself	from	the	left-wing	political	atmosphere	prevailing	in	Catalonia.	By	1977,	coinciding	
with	 the	 first	 Spanish	 parliamentary	 elections	 in	 democracy,	 the	 communist	 Catalan	 Unified	
Socialist	 Party	 (Partit	 Socialista	 Unificat	 de	 Catalunya,	 PSUC)	 	 published	 a	 leaflet	 titled	
“Computing	and	Communists”,	in	which	the	ATI	was	described	as	a	collective	heritage	of	all	the	
professionals	and	workers	in	computing,	in	which	“communists	and	others	had	invested	a	great	
deal	of	their	energy”,	and	computing	was	depicted	as	a	key	sector	for	consolidating	democracy	
instead	 of	 a	 tool	 to	 increase	 the	 exploitation	 of	 the	workers.	 The	 leaflet	 claimed	 for	 a	 better	
articulation	of	workers,	 strong	professional	associations	 -keeping	 the	 independence	of	 the	ATI,	
the	hegemony	of	socialist	 ideas	among	professionals	and	workers	of	computing,	and	calling	for	
reconsidering	 how	 computing	 should	 be	 in	 a	 democratic	 context68.	 The	 use	 of	 ATI’s	 image	
concerned	 association	members	 and	 it	 was	 discussed	 inside	 ATI’s	meetings69.	 Although	 board	
members	were	mostly	supporters	or	even	affiliates	of	the	PSUC,	they	might	have	preferred	the	
incident	not	to	be	repeated	and	to	keep	a	more	 independent	association70.	 In	fact,	 there	were	
only	a	few	members	of	ATI	affiliated	to	the	PSUC,	even	 if	 they	occupied	 important	positions	 in	
the	 ATI’s	 board,	 and	 they	 not	 followed	 rigid	 consigns	 from	 the	 PSUC	 headquarters.	 	 They	
attachment	to	the	party	and	the	common	solidarity	arose	principally	their	common	activism	and	
participation	in	subversive	activities	against	the	dictatorship,	and	some	of	them	had	even	meet	
each	as	victims	of	the	repressive	policies	of	the	regime71.	
The	third	controversy	 in	which	 the	ATI	was	 involved	was	related	to	 the	discussions	about	data	
privacy	 and	 computing	 in	 democracy,	 a	 debate	 that	 was	 especially	 relevant	 in	 the	 political	
transition.	During	Franco’s	dictatorship,	several	referenda	had	been	held,	but	electoral	fraud	and	
vote	 rigging	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 regime	 were	 widespread.	 Thus,	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 first	
democratic	elections	required	higher	standards	to	 legitimize	the	new	regime,	and	that	the	first	
vote	in	liberty	would	be	honest	and	transparent72.	One	of	the	elements	invoked	in	assuring	the	
honesty	 of	 the	 process	was	 the	 use	 of	 electronic	 computers.	 State	 propaganda	 presented	 the	
computer	in	charge	of	counting	the	votes	and	processing	the	results	(a	Secoinsa-Telesincro	IBER-
2)	as	a	guarantee	of	transparency.	At	the	same	time,	Secoinsa	took	the	opportunity	to	promote	
its	 machine,	 as	 the	 “referendum	 computer”	 in	 newspapers73.	 The	 reaction	 of	 the	 ATI	 to	 this	
campaign	highlighted,	however,	 that	a	computer	was	an	 instrument,	and	 that	 the	 reliability	of	
the	system	could	only	be	obtained	by	allowing	citizen’s	and	political	representatives	in	the	voting	
and	vote	counting	process74.		
By	 February	 of	 1976,	 in	 an	 extraordinary	 general	 assembly,	 ATI	 had	 already	 discussed	 these	
issues	among	others	related	to	computing,	society	and	politics.	As	a	result,	 the	ATI	approved	a	
six-page	 long	Manifiesto	 Informático,	which	provided	a	detailed	picture	of	 the	development	of	
computing	 in	Spain.	This	manifesto	discussed	three	main	questions:	 the	situation	and	needs	of	
computer	 workers,	 the	 problems	 concerning	 training	 in	 computing,	 and	 the	 question	 of	
computing	and	 individual	 liberty.	 In	 relation	 to	 this	 last	aspect,	 the	manifesto	criticized	Spain’s	
technological	 dependence	 on	 the	 United	 States	 –which	 had	 been	 the	 main	 source	 of	
international	support	of	Franco’s	regime-	and	asked	that	“democratic	control	mechanisms	must	
be	 exist	 to	 control	 the	 central	 data	 bank	 of	 the	 Administration”.	 Otherwise,	 the	 rights	 of	 the	
private	life	of	the	citizens	would	be	in	a	serious	danger.	The	ATI	sent	this	manifesto	to	all	major	
political	authorities	that	had	some	decision	power	in	computing	affairs,	from	general	directors	to	
the	King	of	Spain75.	
ATI’s	interest	in	the	question	of	computers	and	freedom	reflected	transnational	debates	on	this	
issue,	such	as	the	discussions	at	the	British	Computer	Society	and	the	Association	for	Computer	
Machinery	 that	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 codes	 of	 conduct	 and	 a	 growing	 literature	 on	 the	
threats	 on	 privacy	 in	 the	 computer	 age76.	 By	 1975,	 members	 of	 ATI	 had	 argued	 in	Novática	
against	 a	 computerized	 register	 of	 individuals	 in	 Spain,	 relating	 the	 Chilean	 experience	 of	
“counter-insurgency	 computing”	 that	 had	 helped	 to	 detect	 leftists	 after	 the	 coup	 d’état	 in	
197377.	 The	 French	 project	 Safari,	 which	 aimed	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 centralized	 database	 of	
personal	data,	also	had	a	wide	covering	in	Novática.	The	debates	and	conclusions	of	the	national	
board	created	by	France	as	a	result	of	popular	reaction	against	the	project	(Comision	Nationale	
de	l’Informatique	et	des	Libertés,	CNIL)	were	also	closely	followed	in	Novática78.	
By	1977,	the	ATI	tried	to	inform	all	the	political	forces	about	its	concerns	about	the	risks	of	using	
computers	for	processing	and	recollection	of	citizen’s	data.	The	ATI	wanted	that	the	new	political	
parties	took	part	in	the	development	of	computerization	of	Spain79,	but	also	to	make	them	aware	
of	its	potential	misuses.	Novática	published	two	letters	addressed	to	the	Spanish	Prime	Minister	
Adolfo	 Suarez	 and	 to	 the	 Constitutional	 Commission,	 asking	 them	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	
computing	 aspects	 of	 the	 use	 of	 individual	 data	 and	 the	 right	 of	 the	 society	 to	 access	
information.	 Indeed,	 Novática	 invited	 Catalan	 political	 parties	 with	 representation	 in	 the	
Parliament	 to	 use	 the	 journal	 as	 a	 board	 of	 discussion	 about	 computing	 and	 its	 socio-political	
implications80.	The	most	remarkable	success	of	this	lobbying	was	the	inclusion	of	an	article	in	the	
draft	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Constitution,	 which	 asked	 that	 the	 use	 of	 computing	 should	 take	 into	
account	 the	 protection	 of	 “familiar	 and	 personal	 privacy”.	 In	 the	 following	 negotiations,	
representatives	of	the	center-right	ruling	party	Unión	de	Centro	Democrático	tried	to	remove	the	
article	 because	 they	 considered	 computers	 just	 as	 a	 specific	 type	of	 instrument81,	while	 other	
members	of	the	commission	arguing	about	its	importance.	Eventually,	by	an	amendment	of	the	
Catalan	 representatives	 in	 the	 constitutional	 board	 –which	 had	 been	 subject	 to	 an	 intense	
lobbying	 from	 the	 ATI-	 the	 definitive	 version	 the	 Spanish	 Constitution	 included	 the	 following	
formulation:	“The	Law	will	restrict	the	use	of	computing	to	guarantee	the	familiar	and	personal	
privacy	and	citizens’	honor	and	the	full	exercise	of	their	rights”82.	ATI’s	lobbying	had	succeeded	
to	put,	possibly	for	the	first	time	in	history,	a	reference	to	computing	in	a	national	constitution.	
	
Figure	 9.	 Articles	 published	 in	 Novática	 dealing	 with	 politics	 (blue)	 and	 professionalization	
(orange).		
Political	 debate	 was	 thus	 prominent	 in	Novática	 in	 the	 late	 1970s.	 As	 shown	 in	 figure	 9,	 the	
number	 of	 articles	 concerning	 political	 issues	 abounded,	 with	 important	 peaks	 in	 politically	
crucial	 moments	 such	 as	 the	 referendum	 of	 political	 reform	 of	 1976,	 the	 first	 elections	 in	
democracy	and	the	writing	of	the	new	Spanish	Constitution	(both	in	1977).	A	last	peak,	in	1980,	
coincided	 with	 the	 election	 of	 the	 first	 autonomous	 government	 in	 Catalonia.	 Political	 issues	
were	 not	 disconnected	 from	more	 technical	 discussions,	 as	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 ATI	 repeatedly	
pointed	 out	 that	 projects	 like	 building	 a	 national	 computing	 industry	 or	 the	 creation	 of	 high	
degree	studies	in	computer	science83	required	not	only	state	support,	but	also	the	framework	of	
a	democratic	state	based	on	the	rule	of	law84.		
These	 turbulent	 years	 also	 reflected	 on	 the	 rapidly	 changing	 composition	 of	 the	 board:	 from	
December	 1974	 to	 August	 1979,	 Novática	 had	 three	 directors	 (Julian	 Marcelo-Cocho,	 Josep	
Garriga	and	Arturo	Moreno),	but	from	until	April	1987	just	one	(Francisco	Iribarme)85.	By	then,	
lack	 of	 freedom	 and	 democracy	 was	 not	 a	 central	 problem	 anymore,	 computer	 science	 had	
achieved	some	recognition	as	a	discipline	and	as	a	profession,	and	the	political	and	social	context	
had	 changed.	 The	 ATI	 achieved	 legal	 status	 in	 October	 1979,	 the	 fourth	 development	 plan	
discarded	 by	 new	 democratic	 government,	 and	most	 efforts	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 ATI	were	
focused	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 computer	 science	 and	 engineering	 schools,	 to	 define	 standards	 of	
competency	and	devote	themselves	to	the	advancement	of	their	professional	careers86.	
Conclusion	
This	 paper	 has	 described	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 ATI	 in	 the	 1970s,	which	 combined	 demands	 for	
better	working	conditions	in	the	computer	industry	and	the	promotion	of	academic	programs	in	
computer	 sciences	 with	 the	 lobbing	 to	 preserve	 privacy	 and	 personal	 freedom	 in	 the	 new	
Spanish	 Constitution.	 With	 political	 parties	 and	 unions	 forbidden	 by	 the	 regime,	 prominent	
members	of	the	ATI	found	the	association	as	a	space	of	resistance	to	the	dictatorship.	ATI	clearly	
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identified	itself	with	progressive,	left-wing	opposition	to	the	Francoist	regime	in	Catalonia	during	
the	political	 transition	to	democracy,	and	 its	members	were	well	aware	that	computer	science	
had	not	only	technical	consequences,	but	also	social	ones.	ATI's	claims	and	commitments	were	
coherent	with	wider	cultural,	economic	and	political	changes	 in	the	country,	and	were	 inspired	
by	the	climate	of	contemporary.	
What	this	meant	for	the	professionalization	of	computing	in	Spain?	As	several	researchers	have	
noted,	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States	 the	 Information	 Technology	 sector	 grew	 without	
professionalization,	nor	unionism87	and,	the	case	of	the	United	States	studies	by	Ensmerger,	this	
could	be	explained	by	 internal	rivalries	within	the	computing	community	and	the	 lack	of	active	
support	 from	 employers.	 The	 Spanish	 case,	 however,	 is	 different	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 confronts	
different	views	of	professionalization:	on	the	one	hand,	a	professionalization	supported	by	 the	
state	and	built	on	the	exclusion	of	technicians	non	certified	by	the	 Instituto	de	 Informática;	on	
the	 other,	 the	 inclusive	 view	 supported	 by	 the	 ATI,	 which	 established	 a	 border	 with	 other	
professions	were	based	in	what	people	did,	not	in	what	they	had	studied,	avoiding	any	previous	
barrier	and,	therefore	refusing	the	creation	of	an	official	professional	association.	ATI’s	view	also	
considered	 professionalization	 as	 a	 way	 of	 building	 skills	 and	 gain	 independence	 from	 the	
manufacturers,	and	most	of	its	efforts	went	organizing	courses	and	seminaries,	which	in	the	long	
run	played	an	important	role	in	the	creation	of	the	first	university	Spanish	studies	in	Computer	
Science.	 Indeed,	 some	of	 them	spent	 the	 rest	of	 their	 professional	 life	 in	 the	academic	 arena.	
However,	 once	 the	 studies	 were	 established,	 the	 framework	 regulating	 professions	 had	 been	
replaced	 for	a	more	 liberal	one,	and	official	professionalization	no	 longer	was	 feasible,	 leaving	
software	engineers	as	the	only	Spanish	engineers	without	official	rights	and	duties	by	law.	
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